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SUMMARY
investment attitude refers to the way managements of firms value attributes of investment
proposals and weigh them in their final appraisal. It seems that among firms in the Nether-
lands an investment attiiude exists that hinders the implementation of energy conservation
projects. Using paired comparison results from a survey on energy conservation, this paper
evaluates investment preferences of firms by applying a Bradley-Terry model. The impact of
project attributes on the investment preference is analysed in order to disclose the underly-
ing investment attitude and to identify barriers to the advance of energy conservation tech-
nologies. A latent class approach is used to detect clusters of firms for which specific barn-
ers play a dominant role.
Keywords:  BRADLEY-TERRY MODEL; CLUSTER ANALYSIS; ECONOMIC PROJECT
APPRAISAL; ENERGY CONSERVATION; INVESTMENT ATTITUDE; PAIRED
COMPARISONS
1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The evaluation of the merits of proposed investment projects depends on a
number of criteria such as type of project, amount of investment required, profit-
ability and risk exposure. With investment attitude we mean the way manage-
ments of firms value these criteria and weigh them in their final appraisal. The in-
vestment attitude of the management of a firm will depend on its beliefs, values
and goals (strategic relevance and societal/political acceptability of the projects),
and the organisational culture.
t Ad&s  k~ootresponcknoe:  Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De
Boelelaan 1105,108l  HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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In this paper we examine investment attitudes to energy conservation projects.
For the past decade many people and institutions all over the world have ex-
pressed great concern to the environment and its problems. Nowadays a great
deal of attention is paid to the “Global Warming“ through what is known as the
“Greenhouse effectY As CO* is seen as the main contributor to this climate
change, policies are developed to halt the climate change process by reducing
the amount of COz emissions. In the Netherlands the aim of the government is to
stabilise the COz emission level to 180 billion tons per year (the level in 1990)
before the year 2000 (Energy Conservation Programme, 1989). This is equivalent
to a yearly increase in energy conservation of 2%.
The major strategy to reduce COz emissions is energy conservation. Many
studies show that there are numerous opportunities to reduce energy consump-
tion or to increase energy efficiency (see for the Dutch case Blok Worrell, 1990,
Blok, 1991). Moreover, many technological opportunities for improving energy ef-
ficiency are economically attractive. Nevertheless the industry seems to overlook
these profitable opportunities for energy efficiency improvement, as Werff  and
Opschoor (1992) show. Apparently a barrier raising investment attitude exists that
hinders or even stops the advance of profitable energy conservation technologies
(DeCanio, 1993). Gillissen (1994) provides a framework in which seemingly irra-
tional investment behaviour is explained by a number of conceptual barriers to
energy conservation technologies. Examples of such barriers are: Assignment of
low priorities to cost cutting energy conservation projects, high initial investment
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costs in combination with low expectations of revenues, and a presumed high
level of exposure to risk.
This situation hampers the achievement of the goals formulated in the 1989
Energy Conservation Programme. Therefore it is useful to explore the possible
barriers that firms are facing when they consider implementing energy conserva-
tion technologies. It is also important to find out whether specific barriers play a
dominant role in particular groups of firms. It is too simple to assume that each
barrier affects the energy conservation projects of every firm alike. Even within
industrial sectors substantially different investment attitudes may exist.
The object of this paper is to use a latent class Bradley-Terry paired compari-
son model to analyse investment preferences in order to find an answer to the
following questions:
i) which attributes of an investment proposal have a negative impact on its ac-
ceptance, i.e. are barriers to a positive decision?
ii) Is it possible to cluster the firms in the sample adequately into homogeneous
subgroups with respect to their predominant barriers?.
iii) What are the differences in investment attitude between these subgroups?
2. THE DATA
For our analysis we use a part of the results of a survey on energy conservation
conducted during 1993 and the beginning of 1994. The Dutch National Research
Programme on Global Change (1991) funded the survey and designed its question-
naire. More than 300 Dutch firms in 41 different (sub)sectors were questioned. It was
not useful to examine all the Dutch sectors, because when energy use and technical
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potential are very low, little energy conservation is to be gained. The energy produc-
ing sectors were also not considered, as they are supposed to use already energy
efficient equipment. The selection of sectors was largely induced by the sector digit
code of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics and the sample can be regarded as
representative.
To compare investment preferences among the various firms in different sactors
under similar circumstances, eight ‘?yp&’ of investment projects were constructed,
each type with four project attributes. These project types can be interprated as pos-
sible real world situations, but are modelled on a meta-level. Dichotomous variables,
which we will call covariates, represent the attributes. These covariates are specified
in the following table.
TABLE 1
Specification of the covatiates ~pmsenting  the pmject attributes
I Levels
Covariate
1
~
2
3
4
Description
Type of investment
Payback period
Size of investment
Riskiness
0
Energy conservation
>2years
Small
High risk
The term core business refers to the elementary products, services and investment
projects of a firm. For every firm core business projects may differ, but should be in-
terpreted as an opposite to energy conservation investments. As energy producing
firms are discarded, no conflict between core business and energy conservation ac-
tivities will arise. As a profitability indicator the payback period is used. A payback pe-
nod of more than two years resembles a 5% return, while a payback period of two
years or less matches a 20% return. Empirical evidence shows that’ more than 80% of
the Dutch firms use payback criteria to judge their investment projects and often use
thereby a cut off point of two years (Werff, 1991). A large investment is defined as an
investment which takes more than 10% of the total investment budget of a firm. Riski-
ness refers to what degree the cashflow of a project is prone to general economic and
other uncertainties.
The attribute profiles of the projects were chosen by means of some kind of ex-
perimental design. A complete experimental design for four binary covariates would
consist of sixteen projects. Experience with surveys has learned that many respon-
dents find it difficult to assign priorities to various alternatives if their number becomes
large or even moderately large. Then the chances of random choices become larger,
which yields less reliable outcomes. A trade off between estimability and reliability re-
sulted in a fractional design of eight alternative projects. Moreover, in order to make
the investment decision realistic, some clearly dominant types of investment projects
were discarded. This resulted in the following design matrix
TABLE 2
Des&n mattix
Project Type of Pay Back Size Riskiness Code. . . . . .-. . . . . . . . A_.  . ._ . . A  . ..t..^..-..-..............- __-.A . . . .I . ..--.......  - . . . . . . . __..-  . . . . .. . . . .._....  -_ _....  I ...”  ..t..__^__.__.I___._._._
1 core > 2 years lame low PlOll
2 energy I 2 years small low PO1 01
3 core 12years small high PllOO
4 core 5 2 years large high PlllO
5 energy > 2 years small high PO000
6 core > 2 years small low Pi001
7 energy > 2 years large high Pool 0
6 energy < 2years large low PO111..-11.....11.4 _ -....-..a........ _._-.. - ..-.. T.m..- . ..I  -...- ____.___ . .._.-......__._^____.--.....-..-~--
,
As a consequence of the choice of this design matrix some effects are aliased (see
section 6).
Respondents were asked to rank the eight investment types according to their
preference. Unfortunately some firms were not able to rank the projects. They found it
too diicult to assign priorities to eight projects on the basis of a combination of four
project attributes. As a result 231 out of 313 cases remained available for our analy-
sis, thus a non-response of 26or6.  The sample of the 231 remaining firms showed a
similar distribution by sector and size as the total sample and may still be regarded as
representative. Other parts of the questionnaire were not affected by non-response.
The fact that 82 firms were unable to rank the projects indicates that firms do not
base their ranks on a single attribute, but on a combination of attributes. Hence inter-
action effects may be just as relevant as main effects.
3. A LATENT CLASS BRADLEY-TERRY MODEL OF INVESTMENT
PREFERENCE
3.1. fiomogeneous Choice behaviour
As we have described above the respondents were asked to rank according to
their preferences eight projects (the so-called “stimuli”), which have four distinct
attributes. In fact these projects are rather types of investment opportunities than
real investment proposals, but their combinations of attributes do correspond to
those of realistic projects.
We assume that in ranking these stimuli the respondents compare each stimu-
lus with every other one. Hence from each rank order of the s stimuli S,, SZ, . . . . S,
we can deduce s(s - 1)/2 paired comparisons and the law of comparative judge-
ment may be applied (Torgerson, 1958). Thus we assume that each of the r re-
spondents RI, R2, . . ., R, has expressed preferences between Sj and Sk
0’~ k = 1, 2, . . . . s). In this way n = fs(s - 1 )/2 paired comparisons are obtained. Let
the random binary variable yti indicate the preference score of respondent Ri
when comparing stimulus Sj with Sk, where yW = 1 if Sj is preferred to Sk and
ye = 0 otherwise. Furthermore we assume independence for preference scores of
the same pair by different respondents and for scores of different pairs by the
same respondent.
In the case that the choice behaviour of the respondents is homogeneous (i.e.
the respondents constitute a random sample from a population of respondents
who have homogeneous preferences with respect to the s stimuli), Zermelo
(1929), Bradley and Terry (1952), and Lute (1959) proposed the following scaling
model to describe this situation.
LetH>O(J= 1,2, . . . . s) be the latent “true merir of stimulus Sj measured on a
ratio scale with an arbitrary scale factor. When stimulus Sj is compared with
stimulus Sk the perceived merit ratio H /h may vary from respondent to respon-
dent. As the choice behaviour is assumed to be homogeneous, it is described by
a cumulative distribution function of the log-logistic form with In(H 1~) as location
parameter and unity as scale factor. Hence the probability 7~ that stimulus Sj is
preferred to stimulus Sk is given by
7
1 *
I sech2 (+ =
-h(*)
pk
It is seen from the above equation that the merit scaling is unique except from a
scale factor. Therefore the restriction
S
c pi
=I (2)
]=I
is introduced, which makes the unique estimation of the fi possible.
If we make a logarithmic transformation of the merit ratings, thus
uj = INP,) j=l,2,-,s (3)
then we obtain what appears to be a utility score on an interval scale. It is readily
seen that
17r -
F - 1 + expj-(u,  - u, )}
(4)
and we have an alternative representation of the observed preference data, which
is no better and no worse, but in our study more convenient.
Equation (4) can also be derived in an alternative way. Let ~8 = ui + Q be the
utility score of stimulus Si as perceived by respondent Ri. Here 4 is a random er-
ror term, which is independently and identically distributed for all i and j according
to the standard extreme value distribution
P( cy < E) = exp(-- exp( - E)}
Then it follows that forj # k
(5)
Tjk =Rv, BY,)=&, -Eli a, -a,), (6)
which can be shown to lead also to equation (4) (see for example Train, 1986).
By introducing dummy independent variables dir we can write equation (4) as
1
Rlr =
1+ exp(-$,d,)  '
(7)
/=I
with
i
1 ifi=j
di = -1 ifl=k for all i, and j c k = l, 2, a.., s . (8)
0 otherwise
The preference scores yW have independent Bemouilli distributions with parame-
ter zfi as specified by equation (4). This constitutes a Generalized Linear Model
(GLM for short) with y& as response variate, rs(s-l&Z observations, the dummies
dil as covariates, a binomial error with index one and logit link, and linear predictor
rl#k=f:w&I=1 (9)
The utilities Uj, (j = 1,2, . . . . s) are readily estimated by GLIM4 (see for example
Sinclair, 1982). Contrary to equation (2) the utilities are usually standardised in
such a way that the smallest will have the value zero and the largest the value
one. Note that the distribution of the deviance of the fitted model cannot be
treated as approximately 2 since the large sample theory does not apply here.
There is an alternative and more efficient way to estimate the utilities. Since the
individual preference scores y# are mutually independent and the respondents
are supposed to have homogeneous preferences, we may use the aggregated
preference scores instead
which have a binomial distribution with parameter qk and index r. The GLM has
now yjk as response variate, s(s-110 observations, binomial error with index r and
logit link. The dummy covariates and the link function are given by equations (8)
and (9) from which the indices i are dropped. Both procedures will yield the same
estimates of the utilities and their asymptotic covariance matrix. However, by us-
ing the aggregate preference scores we may treat the distribution of the deviance
of the fitted model as approximately 2 because r is sufficiently large. The direct
estimation of the utilities on the basis of paired comparisons data is also referred
to as internal analysis.
3.2. Heterogeneous choice behaviour
The assumption that the choice behaviour of the respondents is homogeneous
is often not very realistic. Therefore we assume now that the respondents can be
grouped into c latent classes C,, Cz . . . . Cc, and that within each class the choice
behaviour is homogeneous. Each respondent Ri belongs to one and only class
C,,,. The number of classes c and the actual classification is not known in ad-
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Vance. Wedel and DeSarbo (1992) have developed a probab/listic latent class
model for the analysis of paired comparison data.
Let am represent the marginal probability that any respondent Ri belongs to
class Cm, with
C
c
a, =l.
m=l
(11)
The likelihood & for the paired comparisons data of respondent Ri conditional
upon being in class Cm is given by
L,w  = fifr*Fm(l-  7+J-y*
]<k k=2
(12)
where qm is the probability that within class Cm stimulus S+ is preferred to stimu-
lus Sk, with
1
zRlm  =
l+exp(-w,,-u,)Y
(13)
and where ullm is the latent utility of stimulus Sj within class Cm. The complete like-
lihood L of the paired comparisons data is given by
I=1  m=l j<k k=2
(14)
By maximizing the log-likelihood subject to the constraint given by equation (11)
with respect to am and h (m = 1, 2, . . ., c ;i = 1, 2, . .., s), thus by maximizing
i=l m=l j<k k=2 m=l
where A is a Lagrange multiplier, we can obtain simultaneously estimates of the
marginal class membership probabilities and the utilities within the c latent
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classes of respondents. Once we have obtained these estimates, ‘we can estimate
the individual membership probability 6j,, = p(Ri E C,,,)  through Bayes’ rule for each
respondent Ri :
%L,plle,=. .
c am&I,
m=l
(16)
3.3. Numerical estimation procedure
Wedel and DeSarbo (1992) propose an EM-algorithm for computing estimates
of a,andu~(m=l, 2, . . . . c;j=l, 2, . . . .s), which by making use of GLIM4 con-
sists of the following steps:
Step 0. Define the number of classes c. Input row wise for every respondent the
indices i, j and k, the preference score y#&  and initial estimates of the indi-
vidual membership probabilities &,f’  (m = 1, 2, . . . . c). Compute the
dummy covariates di/ (I = 1, 2, . . . . s). Set the iteration counter f = 0.
Step 1. Given the Bvn(, compute the marginal membership probabilities am
(m = 1, 2, . . . . c) according to the equation
(17)
which follows from setting the derivative of equation (15) with respect to
a,,, equal to zero. Estimates of uAm are computed by running GLIM4 c
times, each time with yR as response variate, qrtm = tu,,d, as linear
I=1
predictor, binomial error with index one, logit link and weight &,fQ. This
constitutes the M-step of the algorithm.
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Step 3. Compute the individual membership probabilities &m’f+” according to
equation (16). This constitutes the E-step of the algorithm.
Step 4. Test for convergence. Compute InLfM”  and stop if jlnLfM” -InL”j is sulfi-
ciently small, else set t = t+l and go to Step 1.
3.4. Determining the apptupriate  number of classes
As the actual number of latent classes c is unknown we apply a step wise pro-
cedure starting with c = 1 and use the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion
(CAIC for short, Bozdogan, 1987) as a stopping criterion:
CA/C(c) = - 2lnL + n(c)[ln(rs(s - 1)/2} + 11, (18)
where n(c) = c(s-l)+c-1  is the effective number of parameters to be estimated
when the number of classes is equal to c. The CAIC penalises models that are
overspecified. The value of c is selected which yields a minimum CAIC. We can
only use the CAIC as a heuristic because the large sample theory does not apply
here.
4. IMPACT OF PROJECT AT-TRIBUTES ON UTIUTIES
In our study we are not only interested in the utilities of the stimuli, but also to
which extent the project attributes can explain the expressed preferences of one
stimulus to another.
Hence let the attributes A,, AZ, . . . ,A. of the stimuli be described by the binary
covariates X~  0’ = 1, 2, . . . . s; I = 1, 2, . .., a). For the time being we assume that
within class m (m = 1,2,. . . , c) a linear relationship exists between the utility +, of
stimulus Si and the binary covariates x~:
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in which the coefficients &,, represent the impacts of the attributes on the utilities.
in latent class m. Substituting the utilities in equation (4) by the right hand side of
equation ,( 19) yields
1
%,lm  =
l+w&,,(x,  -xdl
/=I
(20)
If we assume that a respondent’s preference rating is also influenced by attractive
combinations of two project attributes, we must augment equation (19) with first
order interaction terms, thus
ujw  = Po,m  +f:a,,x,  +$-5-&n~~~e j=l,2  ,...,  s. (21)
/=I I=1 n>l
For the corresponding augmented version of equation (20) we obtain
1
*Jtpl  =
l+exp[-f:u&(x,  -xd+$5-&(x,x,  -x ,x , ) } ]
(22)
/=I I=1 n>/
The coefficients /I together with the marginal class membership probabilities and
the individual class membership probabilities are readily estimated in a similar
way by GLIM4 as described above for the direct estimation of the utilities, but now
using the linear predictor
f7Flm = gPwn(x,-xa)+f$%c(X,Xr -x,x,). (23)
/=I I=1 ml
The indirect estimation of the utilities on the basis of paired comparisons data by
means of covariates describing the attributes of the stimuli is also referred to as
14
external analysis. If the project attributes indeed adequately explain the ex-
pressed preferences of one stimulus to another, we may expect that the internal
and external analysis will yield identical results with respect to the estimation of
the marginal class membership probabilities and the individual class membership
probabilities.
5. DATA ANALYSIS AND PARAMETER ESTIMATION
5.1. Analysis of aggregated preference data
The first step in our data analysis was to determine the degree of agreement
among the 231 rankings by means of Kendall’s coefficient of concordance W
(Kendall, 1975), which is derived from the sums of ranks allotted by the respon-
dents to the eight projects. These sums are denoted by Qi (i = ? ,2, . . ., 231) The
mean value of these sums must be equal to 1039.5 and in general to r(s+l)4?.
The sum of squares of the deviation of these sums from their mean value
&(Q&+l)12}~  would be given by ?(s3-s)/l2 if all rankings were identical, i.e.
perfect agreement. They are zero (or very close to zero) if there had been no
agreement at all. Hence the degree of agreement among the r respondents is re-
fleeted by the degree of variance among the s sums of ranks. Kendall’s coefficient
of concordance
&Q, -~(s+l)/2}~
w = I=1
r2(s3 -s)/12
(24)
is a function of that degree of variance, which is equal to zero if there is no
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agreement at all and is equal to one if there is perfect agreement. If there is no
agreement at all and s is larger than seven, the quantity
x2 = r(s  -  1)W (25)
is approximately distributed as Chi square with s-7 degrees of freedom.
For our 231 rankings of eight projects we found W = 0.05 and 2 = 85.958 with
7 degrees of freedom, which is far beyond any common significance point
(P < ?@).Thus the assumption of no agreement at all is rejected and we conclude
that there is a slight but significant degree of agreement among the rankings of
the 231 respondents.
In addition we have computed direct and indirect estimates of the utilities on
the basis of the aggregated paired comparisons results deduced from the 231
rankings. The aggregated paired comparison results are listed in Table 3. An en-
try in row i and column i denotes the number of times that the project in row i is
preferred to the project in column j.
Project
PlOll
PO1 01
PI100
PI110
PO000
PlOOl
PO010
PO111
TABLE 3
Preferences of 231 respondents for 8 investment ptqiects
PI011 PO101 PllOO  PlllO PO000 PlOOl PO010 PO111
- 90 96 95 96 loo 114 117
141 - 120 121 139 130 160 149
135 111 - 111 133 120 147 149
136 110 120 - 130 121 158 152
135 92 98 101 - 105 137 142
131 101 111 110 126 - 142 147
117 71 84 73 94 89 - 94
114 82 82 79 89 84 137 -
16
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GLIM4 provided estimates of the utilities by means of the procedures described
in section 3.1 The estimates are based on the upper triangular matrix of prefer-
ences given in Table 3 above. Table 4A below shows the results.
TABLE 4A
Estimated utilities on the basis of the aggregated preference data
Projects
Utilities PlOll PO101 PllOO  PlllO PO000 Pi001 PO010 PO111
As estimated 0.101 0.660 0.539 0.586 0.327 0.475 -0.105 0
Standard error 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 Aliased
Standardised 0.269 1 0.842 0.903 0.564 0.757 0 0.137
Differencing the deviances obtained when fitting only a constant term, which is
equivalent to assuming that there are no differences between the utilities, and
when fitting the mutually different utilities leads to the following analysis of devi-
ance table:
TABLE 48
Analysis of deviance for testing the equality of the utilities
Model Residual Degrees of Source Deviance Degrees of
deviance freedom freedom
Constant term 225.81 27
(equal utilities)
Eight utilities 16.51 21 Different 209.30 6
utilities
The deviance associated with the mutual differences between the eight utilities is
approximately distributed as Chi square and is again far beyond any common
significance point.
17
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Subsequently we computed the impact of the project attribute values on the
utilities. As a consequence of the chosen experimental design given in Table 2
the first order interactions between the covariates x1, x2 and x4 are aliased. Fur-
thermore, vve have to assume that the effects of higher order interactions are im-
material. A model with only the main effects did not give a good fit as can be seen
from the analysis of deviance in Table 5A below.
TABLE 5A
Analysis of deviance for testing the presence of first order interactions
Residual Degrees Degrees
Model d e v i a n c e  o f Source Deviance of
freedom freedom
Xl +x2  +x3  +x4 94.93 24
Xl +x2  +x3  +x4  + 16.51 21 First order 78.42 3
x1x3  + x2x3  + x3x4 interactions
Therefore we have to include the estimable first order interactions as well. Ta-
ble 5B below gives the estimated impacts of the covariates on the utilities.
TABLE 5B
Estimated impacts of the covariates on the utilities on the basis of
the aggregated preference data
Covariate
Constant term
Main effects
Xl
x2
x3
x4
Interaction effixts
x1x3
x2x3
x3x4
Estimated Standard
impact error
- -
0.013
0.199
-0.432
0.135
0.383
0.096
-0.325
0.047
0.047
0.067
0.047
0.067
0.067
0.067
Standardised
impact
0.564
0.017
0.260
-0.564
0.176
0.500
0.125
-0.424
The utilities computed from the standardised impacts are exactly equal to the
directly estimated standardised utilities given in Table 4, as they should be be-
cause the variation in seven independent utilities is explained by four covariates
and three first order interaction effects. For example, the indirectly estimated util-
ity of project PO600 is equal to the constant term in Table 4. The utility of project
PlOl 1 is equal to 0.564 + 0.017 - 0.664 + 0.176 + 0.500 - 0.424 = 0.269. We
should be cautious with the interpretation of the results in Table 4. Only if we as-
sume that the effects of the first order interactions xfx2, x1x4 and ~2x4  are immate-
rial, we can take the main effects x1, x2 and x4 at their face value. Otherwise they
are confounded with their mutual interaction effects.
5.2. Exploring clusters of homogeneous preferences
The degree of concordance among the 231 rankings was highly significant but
very small. Hence our second step was to apply the procedure described in sec-
tion 3.2 on the individual preference data in order to find clusters of more homo-
geneous preferences. The first problem was to obtain fair initial estimates of the
individual membership probabilities 6+,,,  (m=l, 2, . . ., c). For this we used the fuzzy
clustering program FANNY written by Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990). A fuzzy
clustering method allows for some ambiguity in assigning respondents to various
clusters by means of membership coefficients, that range from zero to one. We
portray these membership coefficients as initial estimates of individual member-
ship probabilities. We performed the fuzzy clustering on the basis of the rankings
and used (l-p)/2 as a dissimilarity measure between any two rankings, where p is
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. We explored up to 15 clusters.
19
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Figure 1 shows the values of -21nL and the CAIC obtained with the latent class
Bradley-Terry model versus the number of clusters. Due to the used convergence
criterion in our EM-algorithm and the possibility of arriving in a local maximum, the
values of -21nL show a somewhat irregular behaviour. Therefore we have fitted a
quadratic curve through the -21nL points From the smoothed values we recalcu-
lated the CAIC-values. The minimum value of the CAIC occurs when the number
of clusters is equal to 11. Table 6A shows for each of the 11 clusters the fre-
quency distribution of the 231 respondents by their individual membership prob-
abilities. The vast majority of the individual membership probabilities is either
close to zero or to one. This allows an almost definite grouping of the 231 respon-
dents into the 11 clusters.
8000 ,
7500 -
7000 -
5500 ’ I I I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Number of clusters
Fig. 1 Values of -2lnL and the CAIC  Venus  the number of clusters
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TABLE 6A
Frequency distributions of the 23 1 respondents by their individual
membership probabiities in the 7 1 clusters
Membership Cluster
probability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2 0 - 5 0.05 186 188 205 205 208 214 217 217 217 221 221
>0.05-SO.10
>O.lO-IO.25
> 0.25 - IO.50
- - - - - - - - - - - -
> 0.50 - IO.75
> 0.75 - IO.90
> 0.90 - IO.95
> 0.95 - 2 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 2 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 2 0 0
_ - - - - - - e - - - - v - - - - - -
0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
43 38 25 21 20 15 14 13 13 9 9
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
.-------------me
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
Table 6B shows for each of these 11 clusters the size (i.e. number of respon-
dents), the standardised utilities, the residual deviance (with 21 degrees of free-
dom) and the coefficient of concordance W among the respondents rankings
within the cluster. Utilities and the residual deviance are computed from the ag-
gregated preference data within each cluster. From this table it is seen that the
clustering technique indeed managed to obtain clusters with substantial degrees
of agreement. The coefficient of concordance between the clusters is equal to
0.10, which is fairly low.
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TABLE 6B
Cluster size, standard&d utilities, residual deviance and the coefficient of
Cluster Size
1 44
2 40
3 26
4 23
5 21
6 16
7 14
..6  14
9 14
10 10
11 9
concordance for the 11 clusters
Standafdised utilities of project
PlOll PO101 PllW Pill0 PO000 PlWl  PO010 PO111
0.000 0.974 1.000 0.294 0.463 0.434 0.356 0.429
1.000 0.066 0.000 0.626 0.411 0.434 0.276 0.353
0.986 0.558 0.745 0.740 0.000 1.000 0.337 0.542
0.661 1.000 0.435 0.390 0.416 0.384 0.351 0.000
0.845 0.000 1.000 0.285 0.845 0.391 0.159 0.196
0.000 0.758 0.945 1.000 0.605 0.912 0.536 0.417
0.000 0.961 0.592 0.773 1.000 0.146 0.158 0.314
0.335 0.855 0.000 1.000 0.809 0.502 0.396 0.493
0.000 1.000 0.525 0.892 0.438 0.632 0.962 0.547
0.000 0.034 1.000 0.773 0.756 0.598 0.841 1.000
0.000 1.000 0.301 0.359 0.415 1.000 0.434 0.880
?esidual
bviance W
26.14 0.74
24.61 0.59
25.79 0.68
11.97 0.42
24.11 0.58
21.27 0.71
8.53 0.87
16.54 0.72
14.59 0.71
20.45 0.57
13.86 0.64
There are highly significant differences bemen the clusters. This may be clear
from the analysis of deviance table given below.
TABLE 6C
Analysis of deviance for testing the absence of dii%rences between cl&em
Model
Aggregate
11 Clusters
Residual Degrees of Source Deviance Degrees of
deviance freedom freedom
3981 301
212 231 Between 3769 70
clusters
The last step was to compute the impacts of the covariates on the utilities for
each cluster. These impacts are listed in Table 7. An italic entry in this table indi-
cates that the estimated effect is not significant at a level of 10%~.
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TABLE 7
Impacts of the covariates on the project utilities within the clusters
Impact of covariates on project utilities
Main effects Interaction effects
Cluster Constant x1 x2 x3 x4 x1x3 x2x3 x3x4
1 0.463 -0.007 0.538 -0.107 -0,028 -0.244 -0.355 -0.082
2 0.411 -0.024 -0.387 -0.133 0.046 0.521 0.237 0.180
3 0.000 0.594 0.152 0.337 0.406 -0.170 -0.172 -0.181
4 0.416 -0.298 0.318 -0.065 0.266 0.648 -0.629 -0.306
5 0.845 0.273 -0.118 -0.685 -0.727 0.774 -0.144 1.025
6 0.605 0.247 0.093 -0.070 0.060 -0.223 0.348 -0.619
7 1 .ooo -0.612 0.204 -0.842 -0.243 0.763 0.261 -0.066
8 0.808 -0.581 -0.228 -0.413 0.274 0.804 0.609 -0.559
9 0.438 -0.140 0.227 0.524 0.334 -0.168 0.077 -0.988
10 0.756 0.404 -0.160 0.085 -0.562 -0.938 0.626 0.256
11 0.415 -0.057 -0.057 0.079 0.642 -0.420 0.459 -0.598
6. INTERPRETATION
The obtained grouping of the 231 firms in 11 clusters reveals a clear heterogeneity
among the 231 respondents with respect to their preferences for the eight project
types. This is already a first step to a better understanding of the observed preference
structure. The differences between some clusters are large. For example, a compari-
son of clusters 3 and 7 learns that three main and two interaction effects have oppo-
site signs. The firms in cluster 3 have a strong preference for core business projects
with a high return. Particularly, the combination of investment size and investment
type has a substantial positive impact on the preferences (0.594+0.337-
0.170=0.761 MI). Firms in duster 7, however, strongly oppose to the combination of
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large core business projects (-0.612-0.842+0.763= -0.691=0). Note that the degree
of agreement within cluster 7 is rather high. Clusters 3 and 7 have fundamental differ-
ent opinions about their preference structure.
Furthermore, there are firms that reveal similar underlying attitudes and neverthe-
less express very different preferences for specific projects. This can be illustrated by
comparing clusters 1 and 2. The firms in both these clusters can be labelled as “risk-
averse” (the underlying attitude), but differ in the way they wxk it out, which has large
consequences for the rank order of the projects: Firms of duster 1 prefer small proj-
ects with a short payback period, while investment typa and riskiness only play a mi-
nor role. Firms in cluster 2, however, prefer large core business projects with a low
risk profile. Judging from Table 6B these clusters cannot be merged. In this respect
we can say that the clustering analysis has given us a clear picture of firms that are
very heterogeneous in their preferences and also in’ their underlying attitudes.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the underlying attitudes of the observed
preferences’ structures, one has to examine both the main effects of the project at-
tributes and the interaction effects. First vw consider the main affects. Firms in the 11
clusters are rather consistent is evaluating payback pariod and riskiness. They prefer
projects with short payback periods (6 positive, 1 neutral attitudes) and low risk (6
positive and 3 negative). There is a dislike for large investment projacts (5 negative
and 4 neutral). This is confirmed by looking at Table 6B: The only difference betwen
the project types 2 and 8 is the investment size (where p@ect 8 entails a large in-
vestment), but project 2 is more preferred than project 8, sac Table 8. The same holds
forprojecttypesland6,whereprojecttypa1  requiresmorecapital.
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The main impact of investment type (energy conservation vs. pore business) is not
considered to ba very important (3 neutral). It cannot be seen as the attribute that
turned the scale (whereas investment size and payback period obviously are).
TABLE 8:
Frequency tables of preferred and disliked project types
Project I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Like l . 4 6 4 3 1 2 1 1
Dislike l . 7 3 3 1 2 1 3 2
l ‘Like’ refers to the number of times that project i is among the 2 most preferred proj-
ects of a cluster; ‘dislike’ refers to the number of times that project i is among the 2
most disliked projects. The sum of ‘like’ must equal 2 times the number of clusters =
22; similarly for ‘dislike”
The first order interaction effects play an important role. We have shown that by
adding the three first order interaction effects to the main effects model the deviance
is reduced with more than 78 points for only three degrees of freedom. In clusters 4
and 10 the interaction effects are even more important than the main effects. The
implication of dominant interaction effects is that similar rank patterns can still have
very different underlying investment attitudes. Thus, understanding the impacts of
project attributes is more meaningful than observing preference ratings or rankings.
Let us take for example cluster 10. Here the interaction effect of type x size is very
negative (-0.938) and the interaction effect of payback period x size is strongly posi-
tive (0.626). Project 3 (code Pl 100) is just as liked as project 8 (code PO1 1 l), while
they differ in three out of four attributes. Equal utility ratings for different projects may
originate from the impacts of the different project attributes.
It \nms not possible to estimate all the main and interaction effects due to the cho-
sen particular experimental design. The main and interaction effects of the attributes
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type of investment, payback period and size of investment are confounded. This
makes a straight forward interpretation complicated. However, our inferences with re-
spect to the relevance of the underlying investment attitudes remain valid; only the
absolute values of the impacts concerned should be interpreted with care.
This particular design was the result of a trade off between estimability and a set of
realistic combinations of project attributes, in tiich no dominant investment projects
were present. The latter aspect was important in order to avoid a bias in response.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our results indicate that investment attitudes of fimw are more important than utility
ratings or rank orders. Different underlying stnrctures can produce equal utilities.
Analysing barriers that hamper energy conservation investments means analysing
which of the project attributes pose effective barriers. Our results suggest that there is
a dislike for large investment projects. The type x size and size x risk interactions
show that firms are not charmed by large investments. In other wrds, a barrier for in-
vestment is a large amount of capital required.
The investment preference is also negatively influenced by a long expected pay-
back period and a high risk profile. These barriers are common to every investment
project. In the case of energy conservation, the degree of risk is related to expected
fluctuations in energy prices. Consequently high expected fluctuations in energy
prices should be regarded as a barrier to investment in energy conservation tech-
nologies. The payback period too is largely determined by the energy price. Low ex-
pected energy prices lead (ceeris  paribus)  to a longer expected pay back period and
may also pose such a barrier.
2 6
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Type of investment does not seem to influence the preferences of firms. The often
used argument of “too long a distance to core business activities” is less prominent
than theory suggests. In other words, our results indicate that type of investment is not
a main barrier to the implementation of energy conservation projects.
This analysis shows that there are large differences between the latent dusters of
firms, and that within the dusters a substantial degree of agreement exists. Clusters
which show more or less similar ranking patterns may have different underlying in-
vestment attitudes. The analysis of impacts of project attributes provides a better un-
derstanding of investment preferences than just the analysis of rank orders. Hence
the model w propose is adequate to answer the questions MS posed in the introduc-
tion with respect to homogeneity and the existence of potential barriers. It enables us
to analyse in detail the impacts of both main effects and interaction effects of project
attributes.
The results obtained with the model proposed here can be helpful for policy mak-
ers. They provide information on how different groups of firms react to “stimuli” and
suggest that firms are sensitive to financial stimuli (e.g. payback period, required
capital outlay) and risk. An implication could be that policy makers would focus on
providing firms with financial stimuli. Eco-taxes combined with subsidies could prove
to be effective to stimulate the advance of energy conservation technologies.
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Fig. 1 Values of -2lnL  and the CAIC  versus the number of clusters
